Duquesne Law Review
Volume 58

Number 2

Article 9

2020

Justice Hasted Is Justice Wasted: League of Women Voters v.
Commonwealth
Carrie R. Garrison

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law and Politics Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carrie R. Garrison, Justice Hasted Is Justice Wasted: League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 58
Duq. L. Rev. 441 (2020).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol58/iss2/9

This Student Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Justice Hasted Is Justice Wasted: League of Women
Voters v. Commonwealth
CarrieR. Garrison*
I.

II.

INTRODU CTION .............................................................. 442
BACKGROUND INFORMATION ......................................... 444

A.
B.
C.
D.
III.

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS V. COMMONWEALTH ........ 446

A.
B.
C.
D.

IV.

V.

V I.

What Is Gerrymanderingand Wlhy
Is It Political?............................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 444
The Difference Between
Reapportionment and Redistricting................. 444
Congressionalv. State Redistricting................ 445
FederalRedistricting Criteria.......................... 446
The 2011 P lan ...................................................
The Claims ........................................................
The Rush of Discovery .......................................
The Majority Decision: The Neutral
Criteria..............................................................
The R em edy .......................................................

447
447
449

45 1
E.
454
THE COMPETING POSITIONS .......................................... 456
A.
Justice Baer's Concurringand
Dissenting Opinion ........................................... 456
B.
Chief Justice Saylor's Dissent........................... 458
C.
Justice Mundy's Dissenting Opinion................ 460
WHO IS RIGHT? THE MAJORITY'S PREMATURITY
GOVERNED BY H ASTE .................................................... 462
A . Separation of Powers............................................... 463
B. The Inherently PoliticalProcess ............................. 463
C. Judicial R estraint...................................................
464
D. The Majority's Lack of JudicialRestraint ............. 465
1.
The Neutral Criteria.............................. 465
2.
Abrogation of Erfer ................................ 466
3.
The Legislature'sImpossible Task ........ 466
C ON CLU SION .................................................................. 467

* Carrie Garrison is a current third-year student at Duquesne University School of
Law. She received her B.M. in Violin Performance and B.A. in Multiplatform Journalism
from Duquesne University. Thank you to my parents for their endless support and to my
advisor, Professor Bruce Ledewitz, for his guidance and encouragement.

442

Duquesne Law Review
I.

Vol. 58

INTRODUCTION

"[T]he way of progress is neither swift nor easy .... " 1 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's near groundbreaking decision in League
of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth2 marked another case where the Pennsylvania Constitution gave its citizens
3
vastly broader rights than that of the United States Constitution.
Indeed, the Court correctly decided that a perfectly gerrymandered
congressional districting map was a clear, plain, and palpable violation of the state constitution. 4 However, the haste underlying the
5
entirety of the decision limited the impact of the case.
Almost every aspect of the decision was the product of impatience.6 First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised extraordinary jurisdiction 7 over the case, refusing to wait for the United
States Supreme Court's guidance in Gill v. Whitford.8 Then, the
Court ordered the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court 9 to complete
fact-finding in a mere fifty-three days. 10 Lastly, in issuing its remedy, the Court anticipated the legislative and executive branches'
unwillingness to redraw the state congressional districts1 1 and dictated that, in such circumstances, the Court itself "would fashion a

1. Marie Curie, Secret Studies in Warsaw, AM. INST. PHYSICS, https://history.aip.org/exhibits/curie/brief/06_quotes/quotes_03.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
2. 178 A.3d 737,740 (Pa. 2018).
3. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769, 776 (Pa. 1996) (finding rights afforded by the United States Constitution to be inconsistent with the constitutional protections under the Pennsylvania Constitution); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 888
(Pa. 1991) (reversing a conviction because under the Pennsylvania Constitution there is no
'good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule).
4. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 824-25.
5. See Bruce Ledewitz, A Lost Opportunity to Reach a Consensus on Gerrymandering,
JURIST (Feb. 13, 2018, 1:26 PM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2018/02/pennsylvaniagerrymandering-bruce-ledewitz/ (noting Chief Justice Saylor's vote on the majority would
have instigated a "candid national conversation about gerrymandering").
6. Id. (explaining the Court's exigency played a role in the chief justice's decision to
dissent).
7. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 726 (2015) (noting the Pennsylvania "Supreme Court may, on
its own motion or upon petition of any party, in any matter pending before any court or magisterial district judge of this Commonwealth involving an issue of immediate public importance, assume plenary jurisdiction of such matter at any stage thereof and enter a final
order or otherwise cause right and justice to be done").
8. 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923 (2018) (considering a Wisconsin state legislative redistricting
plan favoring Republican voters).
9. Pennsylvania Court Structure, PENNSYLVANIANS FOR MOD. CTS., https://
www.pmeonline.org/resources/Pennsylvania-court-structure (last visited Jan. 22, 2020) (explaining the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercises authority over "all other courts").
10. League of Women Voters ofPa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 767 (Pa. 2018).
11. Id. at 821.

2 2020

Justice Hasted Is Justice Wasted

judicial remedial plan." 12 Justifying its actions by use of the "imminent[ly] approaching primary elections," 13 and distinguishable
precedent from 1966, where the Court gave the legislature nearly a
year to redraw the map,14 the Court ordered the legislature to do an
impossible task: redraw the congressional district map in only three
weeks. 15 As the Court expected, the legislature could not meet this
deadline and the Court redrew the map itself. 16
The haste of this decision sets dangerous precedent as it endorses
blatant separation of powers violations 17 and manifests the state
judiciary's charge into the political thicket. 18 Moreover, the case
sets ambiguous precedent as the Court provided only a "floor" of
neutral criteria that must be met for such a map to pass constitutional muster. 19 This "floor" provided no "ceiling" to the state legis20
lature which it could use as guidance in redrawing the map.
This article will first lay out the background of important foundational concepts. Then, it will go on to explain the majority and
dissenting opinions of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision

in League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania.21 Finally, it will explain why the haste of the Court was apparent in almost every aspect of this case. From the grant of extraordinary jurisdiction and
accelerated fact-finding to the ultimate decision to redraw the map,
it is clear that judicial restraint in this inherently political area
would have averted most of the controversial aspects of this decision.22

12. Id.
13. Id. at 822; see also id. at 791 (noting the primary elections were scheduled for May
15, 2018).
14. Butcher v. Bloom, 216 A.2d 457, 458-59 (Pa. 1966) [Butcher Order].
15. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018)
[League of Women Voters Order].
16. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 823.
17. Brooke Erin Moore, Comment, Opening the Door to Single Government: The 2002
MarylandRedistrictingDecision Gives the Courts Too Much Power in an HistoricallyPolitical Arena, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 123, 124 (2003).
18. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 831 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting the
inherently political nature of redistricting).
19. Id. at 817 (majority opinion).
20. Id. (noting these neutral criteria are "not the exclusive means by which a violation of
Article I, Section 5 may be established"); see also Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and
CongressionalRedistricting,BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/who-draws-maps-legislative-and-congressional-redistricting (noting this information is current as of December 20 18).
21. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 740.
22. Id. at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting that had the "process [been] an ordinary
deliberative one," he would have been more inclined to agree with the majority opinion).
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION

What Is Gerrymanderingand Wlhy Is It Political?

The word "gerrymander" is both a noun and a verb and is derived
from the name "Elbridge Gerry," a former governor of Massachusetts, and the word "salamander," which describes the shape of an
election district formed during Gerry's time in office. 23 The word
carries with it a distinct political meaning: "to divide or arrange (an
24
area) into political units to give special advantages to one group."
In theory, one would expect that districts would be drawn to reflect
the distributions of populations, but in practice this process reflects
the ideals of the party in charge, thus making it an inherently political process. 25 Indeed, "[b]y its definition, gerrymandering is manipulating district boundaries for political gain of one political party
or another." 26 Parties use techniques such as "cracking" and "packing," which ultimately dilute an opposing party's vote by spreading
out their supporters among various districts, which they will narrowly lose, or concentrating them into districts, which they will
overwhelmingly win, thereby "wasting" the opposing party's
votes. 27 In fact, many scholars describe the process of redistricting
as a "bloodsport of politics," 28 or an opportunity for "political players
29
[to] game the system."
B.

The Difference Between Reapportionment and Redistricting

The terms reapportionment and redistricting are often confused.
"Reapportionment is the process of deciding how many seats a state
will have in the U.S. House of Representatives when its population

23. Gerrymander, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gerrymander (last visited Jan. 18, 2019).
24. Id. (emphasis added).
25. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 831 (Saylor, J. dissenting) (finding redistricting to have an inherently political character).
26. C.E. Clark, Gerrymanderingand Reapportionment: An Explanationof Both and How
They Work, OWLCATION, https://owleation.com/social-sciences/Gerrymandering-and-Reapportionment-An-Explanation-of-Both-and-How-They-Work (last updated Aug. 21, 2019).
27. 'Crackingand Packing' Tame the Gerrymander, BALT. SUN (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:45 PM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/editorial/bs-ed- 1004-wisconsin-gerrmander20171003-story.html.
28. T. Alexander Aleinikoff& Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting:DrawingConstitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 588 (1993).
29. Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J.
1808, 1833 (2012).
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changes." 30 The act of reapportionment determines how many of
the 435 seats each state receives. 3 1 After this is done, redistricting
takes place, which is the subject of this article.3 2 Redistricting involves "drawing maps that divide each jurisdiction into sections
(districts) of voters." 33 This is the process by which new congres34
sional and state legislative districts are drawn.
C.

Congressionalv. State Redistricting

There are two distinct types of redistricting: congressional and
state legislative. 35 The former is the subject of this article. In
thirty-seven states, including Pennsylvania, 36 congressional redistricting is the duty of state legislatures. 37 In four states, independent commissions create the congressional districts. 38 In two states,
political commissions draw these lines, and in the remaining seven
states, congressional redistricting is unnecessary because these
39
states contain only one congressional district each.
State legislative districts are also drawn by differing actors depending on the state. 40 In thirty-seven states, the state legislature
draws these districts. 41 In six states, independent commissions
draw the lines. 42 In the remaining seven states, including Pennsylvania, political commissions are in charge of creating the state legislative districts. 43 Political commissions vary from state to state
but are often comprised of elected officials or incumbent law mak44
ers.

30. PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., REAPPORTIONMENT & REDISTRICTING:
UNDERSTANDING THEIR IMPACT IN LOUISIANA 1-2 (2011), https://www.nfoic.org/sites/default/

files/Redistricting-Fact-Sheet.pdft
31. Clark, supra note 26.
32. See League of Women Voters ofPa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 742 (Pa. 2018).
33.

PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 30, at 2.

34.

League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 741.

35.

PUB. AFFAIRS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF LA., supra note 30, at 1.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and CongressionalRedistricting,supranote 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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FederalRedistrictingCriteria

When redistricting congressional or state legislative districts, the
designated redistricting party must comply with the federal constitutional requirements. 45 These include restraints on population
and anti-discrimination. 46
For instance, the "Apportionment
Clause of Article 1, Section 2 .... requires that all districts be as
nearly equal in population as practicable." 47 The Voting Rights Act
also "prohibits plans that intentionally or inadvertently discrimi48
nate on the basis of race, which could dilute the minority vote."
In Pennsylvania, the traditional districting criteria include "population equality; contiguity; compactness; absence of splits within
municipalities, unless necessary; and absence of splits within counties, unless necessary. 49 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court used
these criteria as an analogy to state legislative districting requirements because the Pennsylvania Constitution was originally interpreted as not providing heightened voter protection. 50 In theory,
when drawing the redistricting map, these criteria should be prioritized; however, in practice, the party in charge tries to give itself
a numeric advantage over their opponents" within the bounds of
52
these criteria. 5 1 This is called partisan gerrymandering.
III.

LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS V. COMMONWEALTH

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was divided when it decided
that a gerrymandered congressional map, the 2011 Plan, 53 which
favored the Republican Party, was a violation of the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 54 The majority held that the 2011 Plan violated the
45.

Redistricting Criteria, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 23, 2019), http://

www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-criteria. aspx.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 770 (Pa. 2018); see
also PA. CONST. art. II, § 16.
50. See Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325,332 (Pa. 2002).
51. Christopher Ingraham, This Is Actually What America Would Look Like Without Gerrymandering,WASH. POST (Jan. 13, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2016/01/13/this-is-actually-what-america-would-look-like-without-gerrymandering/.
52. Id.
53. Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011, 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. Ann. §
3596.101 (Supp. 2019), invalidated by League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d 282, 284
(Pa. 2018).
54. League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 825 (Pa. 2018)
(showing Justices Donohue, Dougherty, and Wecht joined the majority opinion written by
Justice Todd while Justice Baer wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion, Chief Justice
Saylor wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Mundy joined, and Justice Mundy wrote
a dissenting opinion).
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Free and Equal Elections clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution
and agreed that, in the legislative and executive branches' failure
to act, the Court should redraw the congressional map itself.55 Two
justices, including the chief justice, dissented, 5 primarily noting
the rush to overturn the map in time for the "imminent approaching
57
primary elections."
A.

The 2011 Plan

The subject of this case, the 2011 Plan, was enacted on December
22, 2011, following the 2010 federal census which reduced Pennsylvania's seats in the House of Representatives from nineteen to
eighteen. 58 This triggered the creation of new congressional dis59
tricts, which were tasked to the Republican General Assembly,
members of which were elected in the November 2010 general election. 0 Pennsylvania's congressional districts are drawn by the
state legislature and are subject to gubernatorial veto.6 1 Thus, the
results of the 2010 general election placed the responsibility of
drawing the congressional district map in the hands of the Republican majority in the legislature and subject to a Republican governor's veto, that of Tom Corbett. 2 The map began as a bill, originally
receiving some Democratic supportj 3 and was eventually passed by
the Senate and signed into law as Act 131 of 2011.4
B.

The Claims

In response to the 2011 Plan, Petitioners filed a complaint on
June 15, 2017 in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court alleging

55. See PA. CONST. art. I, § 5; see also Ledewitz, supra note 5 (noting the majority's four
votes "were cast by... Christine Donahue, Kevin Dougherty and David Wecht-joined by
holdover Democratic Justice Debra Todd.... Max Baer[] concurred in the judgment, dissenting from the timetable set out in the order and on other grounds.").
56. Ledewitz, supra note 5 (noting" [t]he Republicans on the Court, Chief Justice Thomas
Saylor and Sallie Mundy, both dissented").
57. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 822.
58. Id. at 742 (noting a census is taken every ten years, per U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, and
the census reduced the number of people in the House of Representatives, resulting in a need
for the congressional district map to be redrawn).
59. Id. at 743.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 742.
62. Id. at 743.
63. See Jonathan Lai & Holly Otterbein, Pa. Gerrymandering's Surprise Co-Conspirators: Democrats, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/pennsylvania-congressional-map-republican-gerrymander-democrats-vote-20 1120180430.html.
64. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 744.
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two counts of state constitutional violations. 5 Foreshadowing the
haste of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Petitioners brought
this challenge right before the 2018 primary elections and after six
years of being subject to the map. 6 The Petitioners, the League of
Women Voters of Pennsylvania 7 and eighteen registered Democrat
voters from each of the congressional districts, 8 brought two counts
against respondents: Governor Thomas W. Wolf, Lieutenant Governor Michael J. Stack, III; Secretary Robert Torres; Commissioner
Jonathan M. Marks and the General Assembly; Senate President
Pro Tempore Joseph B. Scarnati, III; and House Speaker Michael
C. Turzai, arguing that the 2011 Plan 9 infringed on their right to
70
vote.
In count one, Petitioners argued the 2011 Plan violated their
rights under article I, sections 7 and 20 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the rights to free expression and association.7 1 More specifically, Petitioners alleged the General Assembly created the 2011
Plan by "'expressly and deliberately consider[ing] the political
views, voting histories, and party affiliations of Petitioners and
other Democratic voters' with the intent to burden and disfavor Petitioners' and other Democratic voters' rights to free expression and
association." 72 In count two, the Petitioners alleged the 2011 Plan
was an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander, violating equal protection under article I, sections 1, 5, and 26 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution.7 3 Petitioners alleged the Plan intentionally discriminated against Petitioners and other Democratic voters by using "redistricting to maximize Republican seats in Congress and entrench
74
[those] Republican members in power."

65. Id. at 766.
66. Id. at 791 (noting the primary elections were scheduled for May 15, 2018).
67. See About Us, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, https://www.lwv.org/about-us (last visited
Oct. 23, 2018) (noting the national group is a nonpartisan citizens' organization).
68. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 737, 741 (stating the eighteen registered
Democrats were from each state congressional district).
69. Congressional Redistricting Act of 2011, 25 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §
3596. 101 (Supp. 2019).
70. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 741-42.
71. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 765.
72. Id. (quoting Petition for Review at 105, League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d
737 (No. 159 MM 2017)).

73.
74.

Id. at 766.
Id. (quoting Petition for Review at

737 (No. 159 MM 2017)).

116, League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d
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The Rush of Discovery

This case involved congressional redistricting, and thus, federal
law dictated its base constitutional requirements.7 5 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found, for the first time, that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides heightened requirements for congressional redistricting maps. 76 Before this ruling, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected heightened protection, holding the Penn77
sylvania Constitution was consistent with federal law in this area.
With this precedent in mind, Judge Dan Pellegrini of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court granted a stay of proceedings pending
78
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gill v. VWhitford,
which asked the Court for federal criteria by which to judge congressional districting maps. 9 These criteria were particularly important as, before this time, the United States Supreme Court had
stated that partisan gerrymandering claims were justiciable but
80
failed to agree on a clear standard for judicial review.
During this stay, the Petitioners filed an application for extraordinary relief 81 with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, asking for an
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction over the matter. 82 The Court,
in its urgency, granted this petition on November 9, 2017 and assumed plenary jurisdiction over the matter while remanding it to
the commonwealth court for discovery. 83 This, however, was done
without a formal overruling of Erfer,which stated the Pennsylvania
84
Constitution does not provide heightened protection to voters.
Moreover, the commonwealth court was given a mere fifty-three
days to submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 85 However, it completed this task in fifty75. See Erferv. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325, 331 (Pa. 2002) (stating that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's "new view on the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims was
predicated on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 126
(1986)").
76. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 792-93 (conducting a Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887, 895 (Pa. 1991) analysis, which determines if the Pennsylvania Constitution provides greater protections than the Federal Constitution).
77. Erfer, 794A.2d at 331.
78. Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (U.S. argued Oct. 3, 2017).
79. Id. (remanding Petitioners' claims of partisan gerrymandering to gather evidence of
individualized injuries that would demonstrate burden on particular votes).
80. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 127.
81. Petition for ExtraordinaryRelief Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/p/petition-for-extraordinary-relief/ (last visited Feb. 7, 2019) (noting a "Petition for Extraordinary Relief can be filed when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available to a person").
82. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 766.
83. Id.
84. Erfer v. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325,332 (Pa. 2002).
85. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 766 (emphasis added).
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one days after a four-day nonjury trial. 8 This haste showed in the
opinion; the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's fact-finding
87
lacked depth by which to judge the constitutional violation.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then reviewed the sparse findings of the commonwealth court and began to analyze the state constitution, hastily accepting the commonwealth court's conclusion
that Erfer should be abrogated. 88 Thus, the Court found for the first
time that the Pennsylvania Constitution provides heightened protection to state voters. 89 The Court began its analysis by noting that
the Pennsylvania Constitution "was adopted over a full decade before the United States Constitution [and] served as the foundation-the template-for the federal charter." 90 Additionally, the
Pennsylvania Constitution "stands as a self-contained and self-governing body of constitutional law, and acts as a wholly independent
protector of the rights of the citizens of [the] Commonwealth." 9 1 The
Court also foreshadowed the majority's usurpation of legislative
power, stating, "the General Assembly's police power is not absolute, as legislative power is subject to restrictions enumerated in
the Constitution and to limitations inherent in the form of govern92
ment chosen by the people of [the] Commonwealth."
Turning next to the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
the Court found the United States Constitution does not provide
this level of protection, stating, "the United States Constitution...
does not contain, nor has it ever contained, an analogous provision." 93 The Court found the words of article I, section 5 to be a
clear and unambiguous mandate "that all elections conducted in
this Commonwealth must be 'free and equal."' 94 The Court interpreted this broadly, finding it included all aspects of the electoral
process, including "a voter's right to equal participation in the electoral process for the selection of his or her representatives in government." 95 This was bolstered by history which indicated that the
clause was incorporated into the constitution as part of a framework
86. Id. at 769 (emphasis added) (explaining that Democratic voters testified at the trial
as to their belief that the 2011 plan compromised their ability to elect a candidate who was
representative of their interests).
87. Id. at 771 (noting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not adopt the fact finding of
the commonwealth court, it merely recounted it; this indicates that the fact-finding lacked
depth).
88. Id. at 785.
89. Id. at 809.
90. Id. at 802.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 803.
93. Id. at 804.
94. Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added).

2 2020

Justice Hasted Is Justice Wasted

to "secure access to the election process by all people with an interest in the communities in which they lived." 96
This interpretation was not groundbreaking as the Court first interpreted this clause nearly 150 years ago in Patterson v. Barlow.
In Patterson,the Court held constitutional a legislative act that established eligibility qualifications for electors to vote in all elections
held in Philadelphia. 97 Building off this interpretation, the Court
found the Pennsylvania Constitution to provide broad protection to
the Commonwealth's voters, noting, "[the Pennsylvania] Constitution gives to the General Assembly the power to promulgate laws
governing elections, [but] those enactments are nonetheless subject
to the requirements of the Free and Equal Elections Clause of [the
Pennsylvania] Constitution." 98 The Court then paved the way for
its ruling, stating, "any legislative scheme which has the effect of
impermissibly diluting the potency of an individual's vote for candidates for elective office relative to that of other voters will violate
the guarantee of 'free and equal' elections afforded by Article I, Section 5."99 Therefore, any congressional district map which dilutes
an individual's vote is a violation of the Pennsylvania Constitu100
tion.
D.

The Majority Decision: The Neutral Criteria

Based on its interpretation of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the
Court found that the 2011 Plan "clear[ly], plain[ly], and palpab[ly]
... subordinat[ed] the traditional redistricting criteria in the ser-

vice of partisan advantage, and thereby deprive[d] Petitioners of
their state constitutional right to free and equal elections." 101 The
Court reached this decision by developing "neutral criteria" from
which to judge the constitutional violation, derived from the Fram10 2
ers' intent and knowledge of the 1873 Constitutional Convention.
These criteria were used both to judge the 2011 Plan's violation of
the Pennsylvania Constitution and to provide guidance to the leg10 3
islature for future congressional maps.
Relying on tradition, the Court first explained, by analogy, that
certain neutral criteria have been utilized to judge state legislative
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 807.
Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. 54, 75 (1869).
League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 809 (interpreting Patterson,60 Pa. at 75).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 818.
Id. at 815.
Id. at 817.
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districts. 104 These criteria "place the greatest emphasis on creating
representational districts that both maintain the geographical and
social cohesion of the communities." 10 5 The Court then applied this
to congressional districts, finding that the authors of the Free and
Equal Elections Clause, the Framers of the 1790 Constitution, included a contiguous and compact requirement, stating, "[the Framers] included a mandatory requirement therein for the legislature's
formation of state senatorial districts covering multiple counties,
namely that the counties must adjoin one another." 10 This was further confirmed by the 1873 Constitutional Convention where delegates explicitly adopted certain requirements for the purpose of preventing vote dilution through gerrymandering. 107 Relying on this,
the Court announced these neutral criteria dictate the "floor" of
Pennsylvania constitutional standards, stating:
(1) the population of such districts must be equal, to the extent
possible; (2) the district that is created must be comprised of
compact and contiguous geographical territory; and (3) the district respects the boundaries of existing political subdivisions
contained therein, such that the district divides as few of those
1 08
subdivisions as possible.
However, the majority conceded that these neutral criteria are
"not the exclusive means by which a violation of Article I, Section 5
may be established." 10 9 This became a point of contention among
the dissenting justices as this holding seemed to omit hidden criteria from which to judge a congressional map and implied that the
Court intended to redraw this map, as a remedy, all along.110
The Court explained that these neutral criteria prohibit "the use
of compactness, contiguity, and the maintenance of the integrity of
the boundaries of political subdivisions ...[to dilute] the strength
111
of an individual's vote in electing a congressional representative."
Emphasizing the fairness of these criteria, the Court found that this
interpretation of the constitution "simply achieves the constitutional goal of fair and equal elections for all our Commonwealth's
voters."1 1 2 Additionally, this criteria comports with the minimum
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 814.
at 815.
(citing PA. CONST. of 1874, art. 2, § 16).
at 817 (emphasis added).
at 827 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
at 816 (majority opinion).
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standards guaranteed by the United States Constitution.1 1 3 Thus,
the Court adopted the "neutral criteria of compactness, contiguity,
minimization of the division of political subdivisions, and maintenance of population equality among congressional districts."11 4 The
endorsement of these criteria was a decision made by the majority
in lieu of waiting for the United States Supreme Court's guidance
in Gill v. Whitford,11 5 which would have dictated the federal requirements. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have supplemented these federal requirements with state constitutional requirements. Thus, this is another indicator of the impatience underlying this entire opinion.11 6
In applying these neutral criteria, the Court relied on the arguments of Petitioners.1 1 7 The Court found most persuasive the expert testimony of Dr. Jowei Chen,11 8 a scholar in the field of redistricting and political geography.11 9 This testimony detailed two sets
of 500 computer-simulated Pennsylvania redistricting plans, which
more closely adhered to the neutral redistricting criteria than the
2011 Plan.1 2 0 This was supported by Dr. Christopher Warshaw's
testimony, an expert in the field of American politics, which found
that the districts in the 2011 Plan increased the Republican "ad1 21
vantage to between 15 to 24% relative to statewide vote share."
This, and other expert evidence, 122 led the Court to conclude that
the 2011 Plan could not, "as a statistical matter, be a plan directed
at complying with traditional redistricting requirements."1 23 Thus,
the Court concluded that the 2011 Plan undermined voters' ability
to exercise their right to vote and violated the Free and Equal Elec1 24
tions Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

113. Id. (citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964)).
114. Id. at 817.
115. Gillv. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018).
116. Ledewitz, supra note 5 (finding that the majority's rush was a result of their decision
to apply the map to the 2018 primaries).
117. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 768, 818.
118. Id. at 768.
119. Id. at 770.
120. Id. (relying on expert testimony that compared the 2011 Plan to computer simulated
maps that utilized traditional Pennsylvania districting criteria).
121. Id. at 820.
122. Id. at 820-21 (finding the expert testimony of Dr. Chen and Dr. Kennedy to be the
most persuasive).
123. Id. at 820.
124. Id. at 821.
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E. The Remedy
As previously stated, the Court paved the way for its remedy
throughout the entire opinion as it dictated a "floor" of constitutional requirements, the neutral criteria, and conceded that these
criteria were "not the exclusive means by which a violation of Article I, Section 5 may be established."' 125 This statement indicated to
the state legislature that there was no "right" way to redraw the
map, as part of the criteria by which it would be judged was hidden. 126 In this vein, Justice Baer's proposed standard, a map that
demonstrates partisan advantage as the predominant factor is unconstitutional, is clearly better as it lays out exactly what standard
127
should be used to judge a congressional districting map.
Anticipating the legislature's inability to redraw the map, the
Court issued an order on January 22, 2018 to remedy the unconstitutional map. 128 This order invited the legislative and executive
branches "to take action, through the enactment of a remedial congressional districting plan." 129 However, in that same order, the
Court prematurely indicated that, should the legislature and executive be "unwilling or unable to act," the Court would draw the map
itself.130 This action impliedly said to the legislature that they did
not have to agree to a remedial map as the Court was willing to
redraw it. 13 1 This also took away power and incentive from the governor, who possesses the power of veto in such instance, because he
no longer had the encouragement to cooperate. 132 While the Court
correctly claimed that legislative and executive action is the "preferred path," 133 the Court found that the "imminent approaching
primary elections for 2018" dictated the allowance "for the prospect
134
of a judicially-imposed remedial plan."

125. Id. at 817.
126. Id. at 828-29 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
127. Id. at 826 (finding "that extreme partisan gerrymandering occurs when, in the creation of a districting plan, partisan considerations predominate over all other valid districting
criteria relevant to the voting community and result in the dilution of a particular group's
vote").
128. League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018).
129. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 821.
130. Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. (noting the "possibility that the legislature and executive would be unwilling or
unable to act" in the compressed time frame).
132. League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d at 284 (noting the plan has to be approved
by the Governor and submitted within twenty-five days of the order).
133. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 821.
134. Id. at 822.
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The Court cited precedent that was distinguishable, primarily
Butcher v. Bloom, 135 where it "made clear that a failure to act by the
General Assembly by a date certain would result in judicial action
'to ensure that the individual voters of this Commonwealth are afforded their constitutional right to cast an equally weighted
vote."'' 136 However, in that case, the judiciary gave the legislature
ample time, nearly a year, to redraw the map 137 and exercised judicial restraint, stating:
[t]he task of reapportionment is not only the responsibility of
the Legislature, it is also a function which can be best accomplished by that elected branch of government. The composition
of the Legislature, the knowledge which its members from every
part of the state bring to its deliberations, its techniques for
gathering information, and other factors inherent in the legislative process, make it the most appropriatebody for the drawing of lines dividing the state into senatorialand representative
138
districts.
Moreover, in the Butcher Order,139 the Court did not prematurely
dictate that it would redraw the map if the legislature failed to do
so. 140

Additionally, the League of Women Voters of Pennsylvaniamajority found support for its remedy in Baker v. Carr,141 Growe v.
Emison, 142 Scott v. Germano,14 3 and Wise v. Lipscomb, 144 stating,
"[t]he power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a valid redistrictingplan has not only been
recognized by this Court but appropriate action by the States in
such cases has been specifically encouraged." 145 However, the Court
correctly noted the "unwelcome obligation" of the judiciary into the
political thicket, stating:

135. Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 568 (Pa. 1964).
136. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 822 (quoting Butcher Order, 216 A.2d
457, 458-59 (Pa. 1966)).
137. Id. at 830 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
138. Butcher Order, 216 A.2d at 467 (Musmanno, J., dissenting) (quoting Butcher, 203
A.2d at 569).
139. Id. at 458-59 (majority opinion).
140. Id. (noting the absence of this premature language in this order).
141. 369U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
142. 507 U.S. 25, 34 (1993).
143. 381 U.S. 407, 409-10 (1965).
144. 437 U.S. 535, 539 (1978).
145. League of Women Voters ofPa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737,823 (Pa. 2018) (quoting Growe, 507 U.S. at 33).
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[]egislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment
tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impractical for them to do so, it becomes the "unwelcome obligation" of the federal court to devise and impose a
146
reapportionment plan pending later legislative action.
Finally, the Court relied on persuasive authority as support for
its ruling, noting, "virtually every other state that has considered
the issue looked, when necessary, to the state judiciary to ... for147
mulate a valid reapportionment plan."
IV.
A.

THE COMPETING POSITIONS

Justice Baer's Concurringand Dissenting Opinion

Justice Baer joined several of the majority's conclusions. 148 He
agreed that the 2011 Plan violated the Pennsylvania Constitution
and concurred in the majority's explanation of the Free and Equal
Elections Clause. 149 However, the justice dissented from the majority's decision to "impose court-designated districting criteria on the
Legislature." 150 Further, he disagreed with the majority's remedy
to redraw the redistricting map in the legislature's failure to do
so.

15 1

For Justice Baer, the court-imposed "neutral criteria" 152 was incorrect and, when applied, violated Article I, Section 4153 of the
United States Constitution. 154 Instead, the justice stated he would
have held "that extreme partisan gerrymandering occurs when, in
the creation of a districting plan, partisanconsiderationspredominate over all other valid districtingcriteria relevant to the voting
155
community and result in the dilution of a particular group's vote."
Further, he claimed these neutral criteria, when applied, violated
146. Id. (quoting Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977); Wise, 437 U.S. at 540).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 825 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 826.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 817 (majority opinion).
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
154. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 826 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting)
(noting the neutral criteria is in conflict with Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution, which concerns the time, matter, and places of elections and does not address the size
of" shape of districts; thus, the Pennsylvania Constitution criteria created by the majority is
in conflict with the United States Constitution as it instructs the legislature as to the "manner of holding elections" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1)).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
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Article I, Section 4, explaining, "courts lack the authority to prescribe the 'times, places, and manner of holding' congressional elections. 151 The justice also stated that the Pennsylvania Constitution "does not address the size or shape of districts," 157 and, therefore, the "criteria for the drawing of congressional districts [is not
appropriate] when the framers chose not to include such provisions
despite unquestionably being aware of both the General Assembly's
responsibility for congressional redistricting and the dangers of gerrymandering." 158 However, the justice did agree with the majority's
position that the Free and Equal Elections Clause protects against
159
the dilution of votes and was therefore violated by the 2011 Plan.
As to the remedy, Justice Baer noted that redrawing the map was
unnecessary, stating:
I continue to suggest respectfully that the Court reconsider its
decision given the substantial uncertainty, if not outright
chaos, currently unfolding in this Commonwealth regarding
the impending elections, in addition to the likely further delays
that will result from the continuing litigation before this Court
and, potentially, the United States Supreme Court, as well as
from the map-drawing process and the litigation that process
will inevitably engender. 1 0
The justice further noted that the legislature does not have a fair
opportunity to act as, in this case, it had only twenty-five days to
develop a new plan and respond to the majority's argument. 1 1 He
noted that the 2011 Plan itself took a long time to develop, stating,
"[w]hile it is true that the Legislature technically enacted the 2011
Plan in two weeks, it is naive to think that the legislators created
the map in that short period of time, as opposed to developing and
negotiating details of the map over prior months." 1 2 In fact, the
majority observed correctly that the development of the map took
at least eight months as hearings for it began in May of 2011.163

156. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 827.
157. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 827 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.1).
158. Id.
159. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 827 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
160. Id. at 829.
161. Ledewitz, supra note 5 (emphasis added) (noting that the holding was announced on
January 22, 2018 which "directed that if the General Assembly and the Governor could not
agree on a new plan by February 15, 2018, the Court would itself draft a congressional redistricting plan").
162. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 829 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
163. Id. (citing id. at 743 (majority opinion)).
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Further, the justice observed that the majority overstepped by
preparing for the "'possible eventuality' that the Legislature cannot
act in this compressed time frame." 1 4 He bolstered this claim by
explaining thatjudicialrestraintneeded to be exercised in this case
as it was not necessary for the Court to formulate a redistricting
plan. 1 5 Further, he noted the time frame given to the legislature
was inadequate, stating, "judicial restraint [was needed] to allow
[the] legislature a reasonable period of time, which should be measured in months rather than weeks." 16 The justice also pointed out
that the majority's reliance on Butcher v. Bloom16 7 was unfounded
as in that case the Court gave the legislature nearly a year to redraw the map, whereas here the legislature was given only twentyfive days.16 8 This, he stated, may result in "[s]erious disruption of
orderly state election processes and basic governmental functions"1 6 9 and there was potential that even political candidates
170
would be harmed by this rush.
Justice Baer also raised concerns about due process, finding that
the Court's procedure for drawing the map would allow parties to
submit a map without the "ability to respond to alternative plans,
potentially by submitting additional evidence or cross-examining
witnesses."1 71 He noted that this remedy did not contain any provision that would allow the parties to respond to the Court's map,
which did not allow for advising of "potential oversights or infirmities in the map itself."1 72 Thus, Justice Baer found that the Court's
1 73
rush to redraw the map raised constitutional concerns.
B.

Chief Justice Saylor's Dissent

Chief Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Mundy, 174 dissented from
the majority's decision, specifically noting the decision was the
product of haste.1 75 In this dissent, most notably, Chief Justice Saylor explained he would have joined the majority opinion if it had not
been the product of rashness, stating:
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Butcher Order, 216 A.2d 457, 459 (Pa. 1966).
168. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 830 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
169. Id. at 831 (quoting Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 568 (Pa. 1964)).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 830.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
175. Id. (noting the Court's acceptance of Petitioners' "entreaty to proceed with extreme
exigency').
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[w]ere the present process an ordinary deliberative one, I
would proceed to sift through the array of potential standards
to determine if there was one which I could conclude would be
17
judicially manageable. 3
Thus, the chief justice found the majority's haste to be the main
source of contention in this near groundbreaking decision. 177 Additionally, Chief Justice Saylor found the court-imposed neutral criteria "overprotective"1 78 and noted the task of redistricting should
1 79
have been left to the legislature.
As to the neutral criteria, the chief justice found these were an
overstep, stating, "[it] amount[ed] to a non-textual, judicial imposition of a prophylactic rule."18 0 Explaining that prophylactic rules
may be "legitimate in certain contexts,"1 81 the chief justice found
this to not be such a situation, stating, "[t]he consideration of
whether this sort of rule should be imposed by the judiciary upon a
process committed by the federal Constitution to another branch of
government seems to me to require particular caution and restraint."18 2 Further, the justice noted, these criteria were "overprotective, in that [they] guardH not only against intentional discrimination, but also against legislative prioritization of any factor or
factors other than those delineated in Article II, Section 16, includ1 83
ing legitimate ones."
Further, the chief justice pointed out that the task of redistricting
should traditionally be left to the legislature, noting, "the appropriate litmus for judicial review of redistricting should take into account the inherently political character of the work of the General
Assembly, to which the task of redistricting has been assigned by
the United States Constitution."1 84 The justice found this judicial
overstep was a result of the majority who "fail[ed] to sufficiently
account for the fundamental character of redistricting, its allocation
under the United States Constitution to the political branch, and
the many drawbacks of constitutionalizing a non-textual judicial
176. Id.
177. Id. (noting he would have agreedwith the majorityifthe legislature "ha[d] been adequately apprised of what [was] being required of it and afforded sufficient time to comply').
178. Id. at 832.
179. Id. at 834.
180. Id. at 832.
181. Id. at 833; see also Thomas G. Saylor, Prophylaxisin Modern State Constitutionalism:
New Judicial Federalism and the Acknowledged, Prophylactic Rule, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 283, 284 (2003).
182. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 833 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 832.
184. Id. at 831.
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rule." 185 In this same vein, the majority's reliance on Erfer v. Commonwealth186 incorrectly led the Court to "focus on a limited range
of traditional districting factors [which allocated] too much discretion to the judiciary to discern violations in the absence of proof of
intentional discrimination." 187 This point acknowledged that the
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court did not have enough time to
entirely conduct fact finding regarding the issue of intent.18 8 Thus,
the issue of intentional discrimination could not be fully evaluated
189
as a result of the Court's haste.
Chief Justice Saylor claimed the majority's haste was the main
error in the decision, stating, "the acceptance of Petitioners' entreaty to proceed with extreme exigency present[ed] too great of an
impingement on the deliberative process to allow for a considered
judgement on my part in this complex and politically-charged area
of the law." 190 However, the justice found that judicial intervention
may sometimes be justified "where a constitutional violation is established based on the application of clear standards pertaining to
intentional discrimination and dilution of voting power." 19 1 He dissented from the majority because he found that situation "is simply
192
not what has happened here."
C.

Justice Mundy's Dissenting Opinion

In addition to joining the concerns of Chief Justice Saylor, Justice
Mundy wrote her own dissenting opinion. 193 Justice Mundy disa94
greed with the majority's abrogation of Erfer v. Commonwealth
and found the majority's adoption of the neutral criteria undermined its holding. 195 If the Court had followed Erfer, the state con-

185. Id. at 834.
186. 794 A.2d 325,332 (Pa. 2002).
187. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
188. Id. at 767, 773 (majority opinion) (noting that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to fact-find on an expedited basis and its findings included that partisan intent predominated the district lines; however, this finding was
recounted, not adopted, by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).
189. Id. at 767.
190. Id. at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 834 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
194. 794 A.2d 325 (Pa. 2002).
195. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting) (noting it is
possible to comply with the majority's neutral criteria and yet still dilute an individual's
vote).
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stitution would have been interpreted as providing the same protection to voters as the federal constitution, not more. 196 Further,
Justice Mundy disagreed with the majority's remedy, joining the
197
concerns of Chief Justice Saylor and the dissent of Justice Baer.
Justice Mundy particularly disagreed with the majority's decision
to strike down the 2011 Plan on the eve of the 2018 midterm election, because it overlooked precedent. 98 The justice also found the
remedy to be unsupported. 99 Indeed, the justice found that the
Butcher decision allowed the General Assembly eleven months to
redraw the map, which is distinguishable from the twenty-five days
given in this case. 200 Additionally, the justice agreed with Justice
Baer's conclusion that the majority's remedy was inconsistent when
201
applied to federal law.
First, as to Erfer, the justice opined that "staredecisis principles
require us to give Erfer full effect." 20 2 Erfer held that the Free and
Equal Elections Clause did not provide any heightened protections
to Pennsylvania voters. 20 3 Second, the justice noted that the neutral criteria, proposed by the Court, undermined the majority's conclusion that the 2011 Plan violates the Pennsylvania Constitution. 204 This is because, as the majority conceded, "it is possible for
the General Assembly to draw a map that fully complies with the
Majority's 'neutral criteria' but still 'operate [s] to unfairly dilute the
power of a particular group's vote for a congressional representative."' 20 5 Moreover, the majority noted these criteria were not the
entire basis by which to judge a congressionaldistrict map.20° Third,
20 7
the justice disagreed with the remedy imposed by the majority.
While she agreed that the Court had the authority to impose that
the legislature redraw the map, she disagreed with the majority's
haste to redraw the map before the upcoming elections. 208 Noting
that precedent dictated waiting to redraw the map, Justice Mundy
209
joined in the concerns of Chief Justice Saylor and Justice Baer.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Erfer, 794 A.2d at 332.
League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 568 (Pa. 1964)).
Id. at 835-36.
Id. at 836.
Id.
League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
Erfer, 794 A.2d at 332.
League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
Id. (emphasis added) (citing id. at 817 (majority opinion)).
Id. at 817 (majority opinion).
Id. at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 835-36.
Id. at 835.
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Last, the justice agreed with Justice Baer in noting that the majority's remedy was inconsistent with the Elections Clause of the
Federal Constitution, noting, "redistricting is a legislative function,
to be performed in accordance with the State's prescriptions for lawmaking." 2 10 Further, the justice found that none of the United
States Supreme Court cases cited by the majority supported this
remedy. 21 1 In Scott v. Germano21 2 and Growe v. Emison21 3 the Elections Clause was not even contemplated. 21 4 Further, the justice
stated the majority's reliance on Wise v. Lipscomb21 5 was misplaced
because that case involved Texas local districting which is outside
216
the purview of the Elections Clause.
V.

WHO IS RIGHT? THE MAJORITY'S PREMATURITY GOVERNED
BY HASTE

As almost every aspect of the majority's opinion reflects, this decision was the result of haste. 21 7 This was especially clear, as the
dissenting justices correctly noted, in the proceduralruling of the
majority. 21 8 This was marked by the Court's premature order dictating that, in the legislature's failure to act, the Court would redraw the map itself.21 9 This instruction was a blatant separation of
powers violation as it took away power and incentive from the governor and the legislature. 220 By reviewing the separation of powers,
as defined by the Pennsylvania Constitution, the political nature of
redistricting, and specific aspects of the majority's opinion, it is
clear that judicial restraint in this inherently political area would
221
have averted most of the controversial aspects of this decision.

210. Id. at 837 (quoting Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 135
S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2015)).
211. Id. at 837-38.
212. 381 U.S. 407 (1965).
213. 507 U.S. 25 (1993).
214. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 837 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
215. 437 U.S. 535 (1978).
216. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 838 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
217. See Ledewitz, supra note 5 (finding the rush by the majority was apparent early in
the litigation).
218. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 830 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting);
id. at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting); id. at 835 (Mundy, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 830 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
220. League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018) (noting the plan has to
be approved by the Governor and submitted within twenty-five days of the order).
221. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 834 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting had
the "process [been] an ordinary deliberative one," he would have been more inclined to agree
with the majority opinion).
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A. Separationof Powers
The separation of powers in Pennsylvania dictate that judicial
power is broad, stating:
The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a
unified judicial system consisting of the Supreme Court, the
Superior Court,
the Commonwealth Court, courts of common pleas, community courts, municipal courts in the City of
Philadelphia, such other courts as may be provided by law and
22 2
justices of the peace.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has often confronted issues involving the separation of powers and has articulated the particular
powers of each branch, noting, "under the separation of powers doctrine, the legislature's function [is] to enact laws; the judiciary's role
[is] to interpret the laws; and the executive [is] entrusted to execute
the laws."223 Using this framework, the Court itself has admitted
that redrawing a district map "is intended to be a legislative
power."

224

B. The Inherently PoliticalProcess
It is a long-standing principle that "state and federal courts consistently recognize that redistricting is an inherently political process and therefore allow state legislative bodies significant latitude
in rendering political decisions with respect to the redrawing of district lines." 225 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized this
principle in Costello v. Rice, stating, "the courts are not authorized
to reapportion legislative districts." 22 Further, in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's own words, "the role of the Court in reviewing a
reapportionment plan is not to substitute a more 'preferable' plan
for that of the Commission, but only to assure that constitutional
requirements have been met."227 Additionally, the Pennsylvania
State Constitution emphasizes that these districts are to be drawn

222. PA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
223. John M. Mulcahey, Comment, Separation of Powers in Pennsylvania: The Judiciary's
Prevention of Legislative Encroachment,32 DuQ. L. REV. 539, 540-41 (1994).
224. Kristina Betts, Note, Redistricting: Who Should Draw the Lines? The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission as a Model for Change, 48 ARIz. L. REV. 171, 176 (2006).
225. Jonathan Snare, The Scope of the Powers and Responsibilities of the Texas Legislature in Redistricting and the ExplorationofAlternatives to the Legislative Role: A Basic Primer, 6 TEx. HISP. J.L. & POLY. 83, 86 (2001).
226. Costello v. Rice, 153 A.2d 888, 891 (Pa. 1959).
227. In re Reapportionment Plan for Pa. Gen. Assembly, 442 A.2d 661, 667 (Pa. 1981).
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by the legislature by placing the criteria for districts in article II,
'
section 16 entitled "Legislative Districts. "228
The judiciary lacks certain political powers delegated to state legislatures. 229 It is essential to democracy that elected officials conduct these representative processes. 230 As the United States Supreme Court emphasized, redistricting is "committed to the political branch and is inherently political." 23 1 Relying on United States
Supreme Court precedent, Chief Justice Saylor noted in his dissenting opinion that "redistricting, and concomitant separation-of-powers concerns, warrant special caution on the part of the judiciary in
considering regulation and intervention." 232 The chief justice then
cited Colorado General Assembly v. Salazar2 33 and Vieth v. Jubelirer,2 34 noting that court intervention into the drawing of state
lines would "commit federal and state courts to unprecedented in235
tervention in the American political process."
C. Judicial Restraint
While it was not inherently incorrect for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to redraw the congressional districting map, the
Court's haste in doing so limited the holding of the case. 236 Indeed,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review of the state's legislative
districting scheme was a valid exercise of judicial review. 237 This is
something that should be done as the judiciary should be the check
on the other branches of government. 238 However, the Court's
premature order dictating that it would be the final creator of the
map was an overstep, as the state constitution manifestly committed this to another branch and the precedent relied upon did not
239
support this confined timeline.

228. PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (emphasis added).
229. Sara N. Nordstrand, Note, The "Unwelcome Obligation": Why Neither State nor Federal Courts Should Draw DistrictLines, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2011 (2018).
230. Id.
231. League ofWomen Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 831 (Pa. 2018) (Saylor,
J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 833.
233. Id. (citing Colo. Gen. Assemblyv. Salazar, 541 U.S. 1093, 1095 (2004)).
234. Id. (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 292 (2004) (plurality)).
235. Id. (quoting Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
236. See Ledewitz, supra note 5.
237. See Nat Stern, Don't Answer That: Revisiting the Political Question Doctrinein State
Courts, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 153, 154 (2018) (noting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
"briskly dismissed" the concern of whether partisan-gerrymandering claims are justiciable).
238. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 796 (finding that the Court provides a
"check on extreme partisan gerrymandering").
239. Stern, supra note 242, at 166.
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D. The Majority's Lack of JudicialRestraint
1.

The Neutral Criteria

The majority's neutral criteria 240 states that each legislative district should be as compact as possible, however, the standard that
the criteria impose would not necessarily be satisfied by compactness as the majority conceded this was not the exclusive means by
which to judge a constitutional violation. 241 The Court stated the
"neutral criteria of compactness, contiguity, minimization of the division of political subdivisions ... provide a 'floor' of protection for
an individual against the dilution of his or her vote in the creation
of such districts." 242 These criteria would not necessarily be satisfied by a compact district: for example, a district that is compact
and contiguous with minimization of division between the political
subdivisions would still not necessarily pass constitutional muster. 243 This indicates that the neutral criteria are necessary but not
24 4
sufficient to protect the right to vote in Pennsylvania.
Thus, it seems that the majority intended to adopt Justice Baer's
proposed standards, which are consistent with the Pennsylvania
Constitution. 245 Baer's standards require more fact-finding than
was allowed in this case, as the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
was given a mere fifty-three days to fact-find. 24 Justice Baer's criteria would be violated when "partisan considerations predominate
over all other valid districting criteria relevant to the voting community and result in the dilution of a particular group's vote." 247 He
noted that these criteria are consistent with the Pennsylvania Con248
stitution, which does not address the size or shapes of districts.
Thus, these criteria would still allow for the protection of the Free

240. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 815 (citing PA. CONST. of 1874, art. 2, §
16).
241. Id. (stating "(1) the population of such districts must be equal, to the extent possible;
(2) the district that is created must be comprised of compact and contiguous geographical
territory; and (3) the district respects the boundaries of existing political subdivisions contained therein, such that the district divides as few of those subdivisions as possible").
242. Id. at 817.
243. Id. (noting these neutral criteria are "not the exclusive means by which a violation of
Article I, Section 5 may be established").
244. See generally PA. CONST. art. II, § 16 (noting districts "shall be composed of compact
and contiguous territory as nearly equal in population as practicable").
245. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 826 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
246. Id. at 767 (majority opinion).
247. Id. at 826 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
248. Id. at 828-29.
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and Equal Elections Clause, 249 which protects against the dilution
250
of votes.
2.

Abrogation of Erfer

The Court's abrogation of Erfer251 was another indication of its
haste. 252 The majority recounted the conclusions of law and fact
submitted by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and among
these was the abrogation of Erfer.253 The commonwealth court, in
its hurry to submit conclusions to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
found that the tests from Davis v. Bandemer254 and Erfer v. Commonwealth255 were abrogated by Vieth v. Jubelirer25 as a matter of
federal law. 257 While this was a finding of the lower court, the ultimate blame for this brisk abrogation rests on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which ordered the commonwealth court to fact-find
on an "expedited basis." 258 This abrogation was done without any
hearing, consideration, or oral argument; it was merely a result of
these conclusory findings submitted by the rushed commonwealth
court.

259

3.

The Legislature'sImpossible Task

The majority's order, a premature indication of their eventual decision to redraw the map, was also a result of haste. 2 0 The Court
gave the majority a mere twenty-five days to complete the impossible task of redrawing a legislative district map. 26 1 Moreover, in the
same order, the Court antagonistically indicated it intended to redraw the map itself.2 2 This not only represented a blatant usurpation of the separation of powers principle, but also took away power
and incentive from the governor and political parties who realized
249. PA. CONST. art. I, § 5.
250. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 827 (Baer, J., concurring and dissenting).
251. Erferv. Commonwealth, 794 A.2d 325 (Pa. 2002).
252. League of Women Voters of Pa., 178 A.3d at 813 (noting the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court accepted this finding without oral argument or any other formal process).
253. Id. at 785 (stating that the Free and Equal Elections Clause did not provide any
heightened protections to Pennsylvania voters).
254. 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986).
255. 794 A.2d at 332.
256. 541 U.S. 267, 290-91 (2004).
257. League of Women Voters ofPa., 178 A.3d at 785.
258. Id. at 767.
259. See id.
260. League of Women Voters Order, 175 A.3d 282, 284 (Pa. 2018) (noting the Court anticipated the legislature's unwillingness or inability to act).
261. Id.
262. Id.
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they did not have to agree on a map because the Court already had

decided to redraw

it.263

VI.

CONCLUSION

This fragmented decision had the power to set powerful precedent in an area of contention: partisan gerrymandering. 2 4 However, the Court failed to do so because of its collective haste. 26 5 This
impatience limited the holding of this case and represented the
Pennsylvania judiciary's charge into the political thicket. 26 While
the decision was ultimately correct, it is clear that judicial restraint
is needed in this inherently political area of the law. 26 7 Moreover,
the Court would have benefitted from judicial restraint, as it would
have strengthened the majority opinion and averted the decision's
2
controversial nature. 68

263. Id. (finding that if the legislature and executive were unable or unwilling to act, the
Court would redraw the map itself).
264. See Ledewitz, supra note 5 (noting Chief Justice Saylor's vote on the majority would
have instigated a "candid national conversation about gerrymandering").
265. Id.
266. Moore, supra note 17, at 124.
267. See League of Women Voters of Pa. v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 834 (Pa. 2018)
(Saylor, J., dissenting) (noting had the "process [been] an ordinary deliberative one" he would
have been more inclined to agree with the majority opinion).
268. Id.

